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Rights, Intervention, and Self-
Determination
KEVIN RYAN*
Under current international law, military intervention, whether by
one nation or a group of nations, is generally prohibited.' Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter provides that member nations must refrain,
"in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State."' Similar
prohibitions are contained in the charters of regional organizations such
as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African
Unity, and the League of Arab States.3
* M.A. Princeton University 1979, J.D. University of Denver 1991; Assistant Professor,
Dept. of Justice Studies and Sociology, Norwich University. I am grateful to Ved Nanda,
Paula Rhodes, Carlos Rosencrantz, and Dennis Lynch for their comments on an earlier ver-
sion of this paper. I also thank the staff at the Hague Academy of International Law for
their assistance during my stay there in summer 1990 and my philosophical friends Ron
DiSanto, Steve Doty, Tom Duggan, and Bill St. John for their support and helpful criticism
over the years.
1. The prohibition on the unilateral use of force was not part of customary interna-
tional law prior to 1945 - at least, not clearly so. Since its incorporation in Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, however, the principle of nonintervention has been generally accepted as
the heart of international law concerning the relations between states. See Falk, Comments,
69 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192, 196-97 (1975) ("For the most fundamental postulate un-
derlying the state system is the notion that one does not try to control political develop-
ments in foreign societies"); Ved P. Nanda, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 23 WORLD
VIEW 23 (Oct. 1980) (existing rules of international law generally prohibit military interven-
tion); TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 269-70 (1983) (duty of
nonintervention is one of, "certain principles of customary international law that are so
basic that it makes sense to say that they reflect the requirements of society in the circum-
stances of international relations."); R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND WORLD ORDER
(1974) (arguing on the basis of "world order principles" that nonintervention is not justi-
fied). The status of the nonintervention principle lay at the heart of the important debate
between Professors Reisman and Schachter. See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-
Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Oscar
Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984) [herein-
after Legality of Invasion]; and Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984) [hereinafter Right to Use Force].
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4. The U.N. General Assembly has taken steps to flesh out the
implicit Charter norm of nonintervention. See e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissability of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence
and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965). See also G.A. Res. 2255 (XXI) (Dec.
19, 1966); Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)
(Oct. 24, 1970). The latter Declaration has been aptly described as an authoritative interpre-
tation of the U.N. Charter. See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice,
178 RECUEIL DES COURS 113, 361 n.189 (1982 V).
3. See Organization of American States, art. 15, 2 U.S.T. 2394; Organization of African
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In general there are two exceptions to this prohibition. 4 The first
arises when the U.N. Security Council specifically finds that a breach of
the peace, a threat to the peace, or aggression has taken place.5 Under
those circumstances the Security Council can use force against the trans-
gressor, though the mechanism through which the Council would do this
is not clear. Most scholars cite the United Nations action in Korea as an
example of this exception.
Most nations, and many scholars, recognize humanitarian interven-
tion as a second exception to the prohibition against the use of force. This
Unity, May 25, 1963, art. III, 2 I.L.M. 766 ("non-interference in the internal affairs of
States"); League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237 (each member "shall
respect the form of government obtaining in the other states of the League ... and shall
pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form"). See also Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact), May 14, 1955, art. 8, 219
U.N.T.S. 3 ("principles of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and of
non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs").
4. As Professor Reisman has argued: "Article 2(4) was never an independent ethical
imperative of pacifism. In the instrument in which it appears, there is full acknowledgment
of the indispensability of the use of force to maintain community order." Reisman, supra
note 1, at 642. Further, a reading of the entire Charter should make it clear that, even when
it was written, it was designed to safeguard what Myres McDougal and his students refer to
as "minimum world public order." See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, THE LEGAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL COER-
CION (1961). Of course, the meaning of texts such as the Charter changes over time as the
world takes on new shapes, as power shifts, and as new interpretive, jurisprudential, politi-
cal and ethical theories are brought to bear on it. Thus, no legal document, certainly not an
international legal document, has a single meaning written in stone forever. Each document
is susceptible to endless variations and an ever-increasing multiplicity of interpretations.
See generally Kevin Ryan & Jeff Ferrell, Knowledge, Power, and the Process of Justice, 25
CRIME & Soc. JUST. 178 (1986), and the literature cited therein.
The list of exceptions to the principle of nonintervention offers a case in point. The list
can be longer or shorter depending upon how much weight a particular commentator gives
to state practice. Activities such as antiterrorist reprisals, individual and collective enforce-
ment measures, uses of force by states to protect their own nationals abroad, and others can
be seen as exceptions to the basic principle because states practice such activities. See, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1110 (1982) (arguing for the legitimacy of individual and collective enforcement actions);
Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon The Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 Am. J. INT'L L.
584 (1983).
5. This exception falls under a provision of the U.N. Charter asserting as one of the
purposes of the organization the prevention of the use of armed force except in the common
interest. See U.N. CHARTER preamble. The Charter specifically addresses breaches and
threats to breach the peace and the proposed U.N. response in Article 39. See generally
Nanda, supra note 1, at 23. There appears to be a consensus among the nations of the world
that military intervention is permissible under these circumstances. Of course, assertions of
consensus are always overstatements, failing to capture the real disagreement underlying
surface unanimity. Here the real disagreement is over the proper interpretation of the key
phrases in Article 39 of the Charter: what constitutes a breach of the peace? what consti-
tutes a threat to breach the peace? what is the meaning of "aggression"? Thus, although all
nations seem to agree on the broad principle that this is an exception to the nonintervention




paper offers some thoughts on the legal and moral underpinnings of the
use of armed force for humanitarian purposes. In particular, it explores
the interrelationship between humanitarian intervention and the princi-
ple of self-determination, a principle increasingly cited in the contempo-
rary world by secessionist and liberation movements. As these movements
and "breakaway republics" move onto center stage in world politics, the
time has come to examine the ways in which the principle of self-determi-
nation provides both a justification for and a limitation upon the use of
force by one state against another. This paper attempts to begin that
examination.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE
According to the proponents of humanitarian intervention, the use of
armed force is permitted in cases where gross and persistent violations of
human rights exist within a nation. 6 Crimes against humanity, even the
imminent threat of such crimes, it is argued, justify military action
against the government perpetrating such crimes, and although collective
action under the aegis of the U.N. or a regional organization is preferred,
intervention by a single nation is permitted in the absence of collective
action.
The legal basis for this view is relatively straightforward. Many
scholars contend that humanitarian intervention was valid under custom-
ary international law prior to the founding of the United Nations, and
several interventions in recent years have been cited as evidence of the
continuing validity within customary international law of such uses of
force." Of course, it is notoriously difficult to categorize a practice as cus-
6. See Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987);
Claydon, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 1 QUEEN'S INTRA. L.J. 3, 36
(1969); SHELDON COHEN, ARMS AND JUDGMENT 79 (1989); ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 226 (1987); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE
EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN 1971, 76-96 (1972), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C.
NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 487 (1979); Michael
J. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humani-
tarian Intervention, 27 HAEv. INT'L L.J. 621 (1986); Richard Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by
States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1967); Richard Lillich, Intervention
to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L.J. 205 (1969); Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Inter-
vention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND
CIvIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 231-32 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974); Myres S. McDougal & W.
Michael Reisman, Response by Professors McDougal and Reisman, 3 INT'L LAW. 438 (1969);
John N. Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L.
209 (1969); Nanda, supra note 1; Reisman, supra note 1; W. Michael Reisman & Myres S.
McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 177 (Richard Lillich ed., 1973); FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS 101-08 (1977).
7. See Tes6n, supra note 6, at 155-200. Tes6n cites as evidence of the present custom-
ary law status of humanitarian intervention India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971,
1991
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tomary international law. Nevertheless, a new basis for humanitarian in-
tervention emerged with the founding of the United Nations. The Pream-
ble to the U.N. Charter states explicitly that one of the purposes of the
organization is the reaffirmation of "faith in fundamental human rights
[and] in the dignity and worth of the human person."' Further, Articles 1
and 55 of the Charter commit the United Nations to promotion of univer-
sal respect for human rights and basic freedoms,9 and Article 56 gives
member nations an obligation to act, jointly or separately, to achieve the
purposes set out in Article 5510 - that is, Article 56 creates a duty to act
to promote respect for rights and freedom.
These provisions have prompted scholars to suggest that furtherance
of human rights is just as important in the framework of the United Na-
tions as the principle of nonintervention set out in Article 2(4)." This
Tanzania's attack on Idi Amin's government in Uganda in 1979, France's intervention in
Central Africa in 1979, and the United States military action in Grenada in 1983. Jean-
Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Inter-
vention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974). See
also Anthony A. D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101
(1987). The classification of any one of these as a truly humanitarian intervention is dubi-
ous, however. The doubt is particularly strong in the case of the United States' intervention
in Grenada. For a discussion of the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, see infra text
accompanying notes 48-49. The Grenada intervention sparked a lively debate among inter-
national legal scholars. See Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Inva-
sion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Levitin, supra note 6; John N. Moore, Grenada and the
International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984); Laura Wheeler, Note, The
Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention, 8 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 413 (1985); Schachter, Right to Use Force, supra note 1, at 1640-41; Detlev F.
Vagts, International Law under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-home Exami-
nation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 169 (1984). Professor D'Amato would add the United States'
invasion of Panama to the list of humanitarian interventions. Anthony A. D'Amato, The
Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990). For
a convincing critique of D'Amato's position, see Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United
States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990).
8. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
9. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55.
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
11. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 1. This view, however, is not universally shared. For
instance, Louis Henkin contends: "[c]learly it was the original intent of the Charter to for-
bid the use of force even to promote human rights .... Human rights are indeed violated in
every country.... But the use of force remains itself a most serious - the most serious -
violation of human rights." Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V.
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 61 (1989). Opponents of humanitarian
intervention claim that the prohibition on the use of force embodied in Article 2(4) should
be interpreted consistently with its plain language, so that permitting an exception for hu-
manitarian uses of force is impermissible. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 342 (1963); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The
Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 121 (1991) (arguing that the original intent of
the drafters of the Charter was to forbid any use of force, even for humanitarian purposes,
and that state practice has not altered the contemporary meaning of the original text);
Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Inter-
vention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 299-302 (1973); Schachter, Right to Use
Force, supra note 1; Schachter, Legality of Invasion, supra note 1. The International Court
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view is supported by extensive U.N. work in the human rights arena, be-
ginning with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 Numer-
ous other documents have followed, produced by both the United Nations
and regional organizations, proliferating rights and reaffirming the world
community's commitment to protection of rights." Today there can be
little doubt that there are certain core human rights recognized by inter-
national law and that nations which practice, encourage, or condone ac-
tivities such as genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder, causing the dis-
appearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishments, and systematic racial discrimination, are in vi-
olation of international law. 4 Increasingly, states take what H.L.A. Hart
has called the "internal point of view" toward human rights, treating
rights as standards to evaluate each other and even themselves."
Not every violation of human rights, however, is sufficient to justify
military intervention into the affairs of another nation. How severe must
violations of rights be in order to justify the use of force against another
nation? I contend that if violations of human rights are (1) gross, (2) sys-
tematic, and (3) persistent, humanitarian intervention is justifiable to end
of Justice, in the Corfu Channel case, rejected a British claim to have used force in the
cause of international justice. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Judg-
ment of Apr. 9). The Court returned to the question of the validity under international law
of intervention into the affairs of another nation in the Nicaragua case, arguing that the
protection of human rights "cannot be compatible" with military actions such as those car-
ried out by the United States in Nicaragua. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 134-
35 (Merits). For conflicting views on the Court's Nicaragua decision see Harold G. Maier,
Appraisals of the ICJ Decision: Nicaragua v. U.S. (Merits), 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987).
12. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
13. See generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (Richard Lillich ed., 2d
ed. 1988).
14. This is not to deny that the "realm of rights" (to borrow a phrase from Judith
Jarvis Thomson) is dynamic rather than static. JUDITH J. THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS
(1990). Rather, the "list" of accepted rights is likely to grow and shrink over time, as atti-
tudes are altered, balances of power shift, and the number and identities of those given a
voice in the international legal forum change. (Professor Thomson would disagree with my
claim that the realm of rights expands and contracts situationally.) Thus, human rights
remains primarily a matter of customary international law, subject to all the forces affecting
custom. For a useful discussion, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW ch. 2 (1989). For a useful caution against the proliferation of
rights in international legal discourse, see Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights:
A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984).
15. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For an example of U.N. treatment of
human rights as a basis for criticism of a member nation, see G.A. Res. 721, U.N. GAOR,
8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1954) (condemning apartheid in South
Africa).
Nations have, however, been less willing to call for or attempt armed intervention to
stop rights violations. No nation felt strongly enough about rights violations to intervene in
East Timor when Indonesia invaded in 1975. See Roger S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of
East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE
J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 2 (1980). Nor did nations rally to the support of the Hutu in Burundi
or the Kurds in Iraq, despite the ease with which their oppressors could have been stopped.
1991
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those violations.'"
Gross violations of rights are those that are "particularly shocking"
due to the centrality of the right and the gravity of the violation. 7 Gross
violations affect certain "core" rights, which is to say those rights which
come closest to universal recognition, and which are at the heart of what
it means to be human. One of the philosophical sources of core rights - I
do not say the only source - is the principle of autonomy, which pro-
vides that individuals should be free and equal in the determination of
the conditions of their own lives. This means that they should enjoy equal
rights (and equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which
both creates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as
they do not manipulate this framework to deprive others of their rights.'"
From this basic principle flow a variety of rights, including those set out
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which are rooted in the
notion of autonomy. They are designed to assure that the autonomy of
individuals is made safe against community or governmental assault. 19 To
the extent that these rights are necessary to true human autonomy, their
violation, if it is systematic and persistent, justifies humanitarian inter-
vention. To the extent that those rights can be abrogated without deny-
ing human autonomy, their violation is inadequate to justify military in-
tervention, even if it is systematic and persistent.
In addition, gross violations of rights occurs if state action directly
prevents the exercise of an individual's core rights. In other words, gross
violations are so severe as to deny fully to some or all people within a
territory the effective exercise of core rights. Partial limitations on rights
are not gross violations, no matter how permanent those limitations may
be, so long as some room is left for the exercise of the right in question.20
16. A similar conclusion is reached in MYREs S. McDOUGAL, ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 239
(1980).
17. The wording is a variation of that contained in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §702 comment m [hereinafter Restatement].
What follows in the text adheres fairly closely to comment "m," although I seek to provide a
more detailed treatment. See also Fonteyne, supra note 7, at 258 (setting out substantive,
procedural, and preferential guidelines for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention
under international law).
18. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 271 (1987). See also J. COHEN AND J. ROG-
ERS, ON DEMOCRACY (1983). Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that the value of
maximizing human dignity is the raison d'etre of the international legal order and should
take precedence over all other competing claims. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 1.
19. I believe the principle of autonomy lies at the heart of the Declaration's guarantee
of the liberty and security of persons, the prohibitions against slavery and torture, the right
to equality before the law, the protection against arbitrary interference with privacy, family,
home, correspondence and against attacks on honor or reputation, the right to free move-
ment, including the right to leave one's own or another country, and the right to nationality.
20. Were I developing a thoroughgoing theory of rights, I would elaborate on how much
room must be left for the exercise of any particular right. This is not the place for that
theory, however. Suffice it to say that it is precisely at this point that cultural variations and
situational contingencies play an important role in setting the boundaries of the realm of
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Rights are essentially fences built around individuals which keep others
out. A right establishes a certain "space" around a person, a "space" that
is proper to, or an extension of, that person. Human rights, in this sense,
are essentially property.2 ' Just as an easement is not a violation of one's
property right, so a limitation on a right is inadequate to constitute a
denial of that right. A right is grossly violated only if the easement be-
comes so large as to encompass the entire property - i.e., the fence is
completely gone, the space around a person invaded and placed under
adverse rule, and the ability to choose the use to which the property is
put has been entirely taken away.
Violations of rights are systematic if they are part of a "consistent
pattern," or are a matter of "state policy. '22 Systematic violations include
both overt governmental actions aimed at and effectively achieving the
goal of violating core rights, and covert but institutionalized practices, the
effect of which is to regularly prevent the exercise of core rights (e.g.,
slavery, apartheid, systematic racial discrimination).23
Finally, violations of rights are persistent when they are more than
occasional or of short duration. Persistent violations are repeated, again
and again, over time. Admittedly, it is extraordinarily difficult to deter-
mine how long a practice must endure to be persistent, but there are clear
cases on the basis of which we can assess difficult cases. The Nazi perse-
cution of the Jews provides an example and suggests key factors: the per-
secution was the stated policy of the state; it was carried out over a pe-
riod of more than ten years; it was exported to other nations; and it was
furthered through a range of different governmental activities as well as
through officially tolerated, even condoned, popular persecution. While
not all of these factors need be present, the presence of several suggests a
persistent violation of rights is in progress.
2 4
II. SELF-DETERMINATION AS A BASIS FOR INTERVENTION
Thus far, I have contended that where core human rights (those
rooted in the principle of autonomy) are being grossly, systematically,
and persistently violated, humanitarian intervention to end that violation
is morally and legally permissible in principle. One of the implications of
the principle of autonomy is that government is only justifiable if it and
its policies are an expression of the self-determination of the people.2 5 In
rights. The setting of these boundaries must always be a matter of practical reason rooted in
the special features of the situation and flowing from the autonomous political action of the
people in a specific community.
21. See C.B. MacPherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, 1977 DISSENT 72. A simi-
lar position is taken by THOMSON, supra note 14, at 205-26.
22. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §702 comment m.
23. See Garver, What Violence Is, THE NATION, June 24, 1968, at 817.
24. This is another place where a fuller theory of rights must be much more elaborate.
25. The social contract tradition in political theory forcefully argues this point. See, e.g.
JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988); Jean-Jaques Rous-
" 1991
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order to be autonomous, people must be involved in the specification of
the framework, political, economic, and cultural, that both creates and
limits the opportunities available to them. Autonomous people are people
who, through speech and action, can participate in the creation and recre-
ation of their social world.2 6 This suggests that autonomous people must
have the right to self-determination, and that the policies and programs
of a government must be the products of, or at least consistent with, the
autonomous action.
Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter specifically refer to the princi-
ple of self-determination. One of the basic purposes of the United Na-
tions, according to Article 1(2), is to, "develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples .... "17 Article 55 explicitly ties the principle of self-
determination to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
providing that the UN promote, "universal respect for ... human rights
and fundamental freedoms," with a view to the creation of stability and
well-being based in part on the principle of equal rights and self-determi-
nation. 8 As indicated above, Article 56 gives each member nation an obli-
gation to implement the requirements of Article 55,2 thereby creating a
duty upon states to take action against a nation that denies self-determi-
nation to all or part of its people. Further, the principle of self-determi-
nation is implicated in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter, which
relate to non-self-governing and trust territories.2 " In the years since
1945, the principle has found its way into the International Covenant on
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, 1 the Declaration on the Granting of
seau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole ed.
1950); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd ed., 1965). Some
philosophers argue that this requirement can never be fulfilled, and so no government is
justifiable. See ROBERT P. WOLFE, IN DEFENCE OF ANARCHISM (1970). Others contend that
the requirement can be satisfied, but only by a severely limited, minimal government. See,
e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Still others believe autonomy is
consistent with a far less limited government. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); AMY GUTMANN, LmERAL EQUALITY (1980).
26. To say people must be able to participate in the constitution of their social world is
to assert that political action must be possible, not necessarily that all people take advan-
tage of the occasions to speak and act. In a passive sense people constitute their social world
no matter how oppressive their surroundings. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY (1984). The principle of autonomy, however, requires more than this minimal in-
volvement. It requires active participation through speech and action in constructing and
remodeling the economic, political, and cultural structures. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
27. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
30. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-91. Article 73, in particular, obliges states administering
non-self-governing territories "to develop self-government, to take due account of the politi-
cal aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions .... U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
31. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
VOL. 20:1
INTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 2 and the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations. 3 In addi-
tion, the International Court of Justice has affirmed the right to self-de-
termination in its advisory opinions in the Namibia and Western Sahara
cases.
3 4
The principle of self-determination is extremely complicated, and I
do not intend to provide a full-scale analysis in this essay.3 5 Long applied
(1967). Article 1 of the Covenant provides: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development." The same wording is repeated in Article 1 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
32. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961). Interestingly, and in keeping with the fact that the current realm of international
law is a system of states, the Declaration prohibits all attempts designed to achieve, "the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of any state."
Such a prohibition clearly cuts against most contemporary self-determination claims.
33. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971)("all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter"). See C. Don Johnson,
Note, Toward Self-Determination - A Reappraisal as Reflected in the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145 (1973). The principle is also contained in
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
34. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12.
35. An extensive, indeed exhaustive, literature exists on the meaning and application of
the principle of self-determination. See M.C. Bassiouni, 'Self-Determination' and the
Palestinians, 65 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 31 (1971); LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LE-
GITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human
Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H.
Weston eds., 1976); Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities,
25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 102 (1976); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
459 (1971); Robert A. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1 DET.
C.L. REV. 71 (1975); HAROLD S. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS (1967); Myres S. McDougal et al., The Protection of Respect and Human Rights:
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 919 (1975); Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE
(1982); Dov RONEN, THE QUESTION FOR SELF-DETERMINATION (1979); J.N. SAXENA, SELF-DE-
TERMINATION: FROM BIAFRA TO BANGLA DESH (1978); SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, RE-
GIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980); A.
RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1973); Eisuke Suzuki,
Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separa-
tion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976); Gebre H. Tesfagiorgis, Self-Determination: Its Evolution
and Practice by the United Nations and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea, 6 WIs.
INT'L L.J. 75 (1987); UMOZURiKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1972).
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only in the colonial context, granting colonial peoples a right to self-de-
termination, 6 it has increasingly been used in the post-colonial age by
separatist groups and secessionist movements around the globe as a justi-
fication for their activities."7 Legal scholars - even the United Nations
itself - have generally agreed that the principle of self-determination
may well have applicability outside of the colonial context, though within
rather strict limits.38
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the right to self-determination is
the delimitation of the "people" who possess it.39 How large of a group is
a "people?" What key characteristic of a group of humans distinguishes
them as a "people?" Do all members of an ethnic group constitute a
"people?" Do co-religionists or all speakers of a particular language con-
stitute a "people?" Must all be members of a single tribe? Must all live
within an already established geographical area? These are not easy ques-
tions to answer, nor is there any agreement on the answers among nations
or legal scholars. Certainly, to be a "people" a group of persons must see
themselves as a single people. But this standard is highly subjective and
changeable. Surely something else, some objective fact or set of facts
about the group, must be required.
For our purposes, let us imagine we have worked our way through
these difficulties and have located the subject of the right to self-determi-
36. As Professor Nanda has pointed out, "self-determination, at least in the specific
context of colonialism, has acquired the status of an established rule of customary interna-
tional law." Nanda, supra note 35, at 259. See also Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 35, at 147.
But see S. Prakash Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260,
271 (1973) (insufficient evidence that self-determination has become a principle of interna-
tional law); Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in NEW STATES
IN THE MODERN WORLD 136 (Martin Kilson ed. 1975) (decolonization insufficient to demon-
strate the establishment of self-determination as a principle of customary international law).
37. See, e.g., Agolo Auma-Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of United Nations Activity
in the Congo and its Significance for Contemporary Africa, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451
(1975); Lung-Chu Chen & W. Michael Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for Interna-
tional Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599 (1972); John A. Collins, Note, Self-Determination in Interna-
tional Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137 (1980); Hazen, Minorities in
Revolt: The Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, in THE POLITIcAL ROLE OF MINORITY
GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 49 (Ronald D. McLaurin ed. 1979); David L. Johnson, Com-
ment, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 887 (1978); J. Robert Maguire, Note,
The Decolonization of Belize: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity, 22 VA. J. INT'L L.
849 (1982); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of
Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
321 (1972); CONOR C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND (1972); Tesfagiorgis, supra note 35; Mark
A. Thiboldeau, Note, The Legality of an Independent Quebec: Canadian Constitutional
Law and Self-Determination in International Law, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99 (1979);
M.C. van Welt van Praag, Tibet and the Right to Self-Determination, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
279 (1979).
38. See generally Nanda, supra note 35, at 263-66 (assessing various arguments against
applying self-determination outside the colonial context). For the purposes of this article, I
will assume without argument that self-determination does have applicability outside of
decolonization issues, though subject to limitations.
39. See works cited supra note 35.
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nation, that we have isolated a people which we believe has a right to self-
determination. What does that right confer?40 There are two types of an-
swers to this question, and both may be correct. The answers depend
upon a distinction between external and internal self-determination. Ex-
ternal self-determination has to do with the determination of the na-
tional self, and confers a right to independence to a people. Internal self-
determination, on the other hand, relates to the governmental, economic,
and social order within national boundaries; it confers a right to individu-
als and groups to participate in the creation and re-creation of internal
social order. I think both the right to independence and the right to par-
ticipate in the internal processes of social order construction are implicit
in the principle of self-determination, and I can see no persuasive, princi-
pled way to eliminate either one of these aspects of self-determination
from its legal meaning. Notice, however, the effect of such an understand-
ing of self-determination on the permissibility of humanitarian interven-
tion. A gross, systematic, and persistent denial of self-determination -
that is, a denial of the rights of independence and to participation in in-
ternal, interactive processes - may justify humanitarian intervention in
principle. This suggests that humanitarian intervention may be permissi-
ble to support liberation movements,4 1 but, and this is an important limi-
tation, only when the people seeking liberation have been grossly, system-
atically, and persistently denied an opportunity to determine themselves,
to establish their own nation. In addition, dictatorship, if extended be-
yond moments of immediate crisis, generally violates the self-determina-
tion principle since it places into the hands of a single individual or group
of individuals all power to determine the internal shape of a nation and
prevents people from speaking and acting to constitute their own social
order. Under a dictatorship the people are permitted no voice, are not
listened to by their governors, and are prevented from speaking in certain
ways. Any government that, in principle, prevents the exercise of people's
right to internal self-determination is illegitimate, and efforts by outside
forces to give a voice to the people are justifiable in principle.
Intervention, however, must seek to make room for the autonomous
activities of the people inside a territory in order for the use of force to be
40. The literature on this question is inconclusive. See Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 35.
41. Reisman argues that intervention to.enhance popular rule is justifiable despite the
seeming prohibition of Article 2(4). The "peoples" to which he would apply this, I believe,
are already established nations suffering under a totalitarian yoke. There are several
problems with his thesis, not least of which is that he does not extend it to include the self-
determination of peoples, such as the Eritreans or the Kurds, who have not been permitted
to establish themselves as a nation in the modern state system. In addition, Reisman seems
to be far too sanguine about the virtues of intervention, for he appears to find any interven-
tion aimed at the furtherance of self-determination to be justified under international law.
This ignores the tendency of powerful or aggressive states to claim a humanitarian justifica-
tion as a cover for non-humanitarian military adventures, the possibility that excessive force
will be used by the intervener, and the likelihood that the consequences of forceful interven-
tion will be worse (perhaps far wQrse) than the available alternatives.
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justified. The intervening party must be seeking only to destroy the barri-
ers to the exercise of self-determination, not to install its own favored
form of economic, political, or cultural order. Self-determination, as Mill
argued, is not the same as free institutions;42 rather, it is more inclusive,
describing less a particular institutional arrangement than a process by
which a community arrives at that arrangement. A nation can be self-
determining even if its people do not establish free political institutions.
This means that self-determination is denied if an invader replaces the
internal processes of creation by forcefully establishing any institutional
arrangement, however free. Such a intervener has merely replaced one
form of tyranny with another. Political freedom can be won only by the
members of the community themselves, it cannot be imposed from
without.'
III. LIMITATIONS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The discussion to this point may appear to present a tolerant concep-
tion of the justifiability of humanitarian intervention. But humanitarian
intervention is not easily justified, and its exercise is severely limited in a
number of ways. Further, these limits are rooted not only in the practical
contingencies of particular cases, but in the very structure of the justify-
ing theory itself. While humanitarian intervention may be justified in
principle, its actual use will rarely be permissible because its use will run
afoul of one or more of these limitations.
A. Purity of Motive
The first limit stems from what can be called the "purity of motive"
requirement. The motives of the intervening nation must be "pure,"
meaning that the intervener must be seeking to end the violation of rights
and only to end such violations." Once the violations have ended, the
42. See John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, reprinted in THE VIET-
NAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 24, 36-37 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968).
43. The type of political institutions that emerge out of a process of self-determination
depends upon the interactive processes of the political culture in a particular nation. Politi-
cal institutions grown in the soil of another political culture cannot successfully be trans-
planted to nations whose cultural soil will not support them. This has been the experience
of imposed U.S. modeled democracies in many parts of the world. See NOAM CHOMSKY &
EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979);
PENNY LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE (1980). See also GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA,
CIVIc CULTURE (1963).
44. Compare Comment, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French
Intervention in Syria Re-examined, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 182, 190 (1986); Franck &
Rodley, supra note 11, at 278-79 ("must have occurred when the humanitarian motive is at
least balanced, if not outweighed, by a desire to protect alien property or to reinforce socio-
political and economic instruments of the status quo"). Michael Walzer claims to have
found no examples of pure humanitarian intervention. "States don't send their soldiers into
other states, it seems, only in order to save lives. The lives of foreigners don't weigh that
heavily in the scales of domestic decision-making." WALZER, supra note 6, at 101-02. See
also BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 339-40; Farer, supra note 11, at 121.
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intervening state must leave the field open for the self-determination of
the now-liberated people. It is wrong to intervene on behalf of people and
fail to respect their own ends by imposing one's own self-interested ends
on them."5 An intervention which, in reality, is designed to achieve the
selfish purposes of the intervening party - e.g., to rid itself of an annoy-
ing, belligerent, or merely uncooperative neighbor, or to establish any vi-
sion of world order (no matter how benevolent) - exceeds this strict lim-
itation, and, hence, is unjustified.
Notice how the principle of self-determination operates both as a jus-
tification for humanitarian intervention and as a limit on how it is prac-
ticed. Humanitarian intervention to end a denial of self-determination is
permissible only when the people are free to engage in self-determination.
If after the intervention they still will not have the opportunity to consti-
tute for themselves the social order in which they will live, the interven-
tion is not justified.
The purity of motive requirement has two significant implications.
First, interventions with mixed motives - combining a desire to end a
denial of rights with a desire to achieve certain selfish utilitarian goals of
the intervener - are not justified, for it is not truly humanitarian in na-
ture. Many commentators argue that mixed motives are permissible so
long as "the overriding motive is the protection of human rights. 4' But it
is highly unlikely that any state will confess to the nefarious motives un-
derlying its decision to use armed force; instead, its public pronounce-
ments will loudly proclaim that humanitarian concerns are uppermost in
its thoughts. How is it possible to sift through the fog of public relations
and ascertain what motive is "really overriding?" Further, one extremely
difficult problem with any theory that refers to the motives of "states" is
that a "state" cannot be the possessor of motives. State action is action
by one or a group of individuals in the name of the state. These individu-
als may be working from a variety of motives, and it is possible that no
two of the individuals will have the same motives or combination of mo-
tives. The motive of a "state," then, will always be a congeries of different
motives. This difficulty is shared by both the mixed motive proponents
and those, who insist that motives must be purely humanitarian. Never-
theless, where different motives appear to be behind the actions of a
state, it is far easier to apply the purity of motive standard than to con-
duct the weighing process necessary to determine the "overriding" motive
of state action.
More importantly, permitting mixed motives is to court the danger
that the assertion of humanitarian concern will be merely a cover for
other, quite different, actual interests .4  With the assurance that other
45. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 652; WALZER, supra note 6, at 104.
46. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 6, at 350-51. See also Ved P. Nanda, The
United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order (pts. I & II),
43 DEN. L.J. 439, 475 (1966), 44 DEN. L.J. 225 (1967); Fonteyne, supra note 7, at 262.
47. This concern underlies Schachter's critique of Reisman's expansive view on the le-
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motives are permissible so long as the humanitarian one is foremost,
states will be encouraged to use force first and later engage in creative
accounting to fit their actions into the balance sheet in the legally pre-
scribed manner. The predictable result will be that powerful and aggres-
sive states will be given a license to romp over their neighbor's soil in
pursuit of selfish ends. Further, the only safeguard against such an even-
tuality is to recognize that the only justification for humanitarian inter-
vention is to end the violation of human rights, and that particular inter-
ventions can only be justified if the intervener's motives are completely
parallel with this justification.
Many writers cite the 1971 Indian intervention in East Pakistan as
an example of humanitarian intervention. 48 But despite India's rhetoric,
and despite the fact that conditions in East Pakistan would have justified
humanitarian intervention, India's motives were mixed, and so its inter-
vention was unjustified. Undoubtedly the series of massacres of East
Pakistani Bengalis by West Pakistani troops constituted genocide, and,
hence, would have justified military intervention to stop them. But India
did not intervene to stop the massacres solely because doing so was the
humanitarian thing to do. Rather, it was in India's interest to end the
massacres and thereby solve a serious refugee problem. Further, India
benefitted enormously by the secession of East from West Pakistan, for
this ended a situation in which India was virtually surrounded by a rela-
tively powerful nation with which relations were anything but cordial.
Thus, the massacres provided a convenient pretext for carrying out an
important goal of Indian domestic and foreign policy. It is highly unlikely
that India would have invaded had it not stood to gain greatly from doing
so: nations are usually reluctant to help others if it is not in their own
interest. Thus, the motivating force behind the intervention was not hu-
manitarian concern, but self-interest, and although in the abstract an in-
tervention in East Pakistan was assuredly justifiable, India's intervention
was not.49
Second, interventions which use excessive force - whether in terms
of quantity of force, duration of involvement, or geographical extent of
military action - are also unjustifiable. This is merely a restatement of
the traditional principle of proportionality: force must be proportional to
the size of the wrong being addressed. 50 Given that the purpose of hu-
gality of the use of force. See Schachter, Legality of Invasion, supra note 1.
48. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 6, at 105; COHEN, supra note 6, at 79. Curiously, India
itself did not assert the violation of rights as the justification for its intervention, claiming
instead that it acted in self-defense (a much less persuasive claim).
49. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 11 (reaching a similar conclusion). Contra Rich-
ard Lillich, Rapporteur, The International Protection of Human Rights by General Inter-
national Law, Second Interim Report of the Sub-Committee, in REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 38, 54 (1972).
50. For a recent statement of this principle in regard to humanitarian intervention, see
Tes6n, supra note 6, at 5. See also Nanda, supra note 1, at 24; Nanda, supra note 46, pt. I
at 475; Moore, supra note 6, at 264.
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manitarian intervention is to liberate people from their oppressors, the
only force that is justified is the force that is necessary and sufficient to
end the violation of rights. The use of excessive force, force that is dispro-
portionate to the demands of the situation, renders the action unjustified.
Lengthy involvement in the internal affairs of a nation beyond the time
needed to inititate the process of self-determination, or taking advantage
of a chaotic situation to push one's military forces into places where their
presence is not necessary to foster self-determination, bespeak motives
other than a concern for rights. The purity of motive requirement strictly
limits the quantity, duration, and extent of the use of armed force to
what must be used to end the violation of rights and forbids any use of
force which flows from any other purpose.
B. The Consequences of Intervention
Additional limitations on humanitarian intervention are founded on
the expected consequences of the use of armed force in any given situa-
tion. For humanitarian intervention to be proper in any given case, its
reasonably foreseeable consequences must be better than the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of each available alternative. This does not
mean that humanitarian intervention must be the last resort; indeed, it
may theoretically be the first resort. What is required is not that all the
other alternatives be tried, but that they be considered seriously, and that
when compared to intervention the other alternatives seem reasonably
likely to produce worse results than intervention.
The consequences of international actions, particularly those involv-
ing the use of force, should be assessed on the basis of three considera-
tions: justice, autonomy, and welfare. 1 An intervention that is likely to
lead to a more just society is, in that regard, morally justified; an inter-
vention that is likely to produce a less just social order is not.2 Likewise,
an intervention that enhances human autonomy is more likely to be justi-
fied than an intervention that diminishes autonomy. Finally, an interven-
tion that increases human happiness, and especially one that reduces
human suffering, is more justifiable than an intervention that increases
suffering. In determining whether or not an intervention is justified as a
means of correcting the grave wrongs against which it is directed, its
probable consequences for justice, autonomy, and human welfare should
be ascertained, and compared with the probable consequences of the
51. See Robert Audi, On the Meaning and Justification of Violence, in VIOLENCE 59
(Jerome A. Shaffer ed., 1971).
52. This essay is not the place to develop a theory of justice. In general, I conceive
justice to be a micro-phenomenon, a local production of the interaction of people within
narrowly defined groups. Thus, conceptions of justice vary from group to group, as well as
from moral tradition to moral tradition. See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?
WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). I am skeptical of any attempt to develop grand, macro-level
theories of justice. Rather, justice must be defined - since there is no eternal essence of
justice - in the terms of those to whose interrelations it applies.
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available alternatives. Intervention is only justified if it is the alternative
that realistically and foreseeably will produce the best consequences mea-
sured by these considerations."3
Considerations of autonomy make the consequences to the people
whose rights were being violated of particular importance.54 If the goal of
intervention is to stop the violation of human rights, it is essential that it
have a significant likelihood of success. If people are already being op-
pressed, military action against the government brings with it the great
danger that the level of oppression and suffering, and the extent of
human rights violations, will only be increased, initially as an internal
response to the intervention, and in the long term as a corrective to those
who may have supported (in whatever way) a failed intervention. A state
contemplating intervention must carefully evaluate the probability that
its action will actually liberate a people so that they can create a viable
national self and participate in the constitution of their own social order.
Interventions which seem unlikely to have these results are not justified.
Further, considerations of justice, autonomy, and welfare all suggest
that states recognize that any use of force, coupled with an accepted
claim that the use was permitted under international law, may very well
have the result that armed attacks against peaceful governments will be
legitimated, making it easier for other states with less admirable motives
to use force in less justifiable circumstances. 5 A world in which armed
force is too easily justified is one in which powerful and aggressive nations
can bully other nations and claim international law (as they have histori-
53. Notice I do not base the legitimacy of the intervention on the actual consequences,
but only on foreseeable consequences. It is foolish to expect states and their leaders to be
seers who can know the precise consequences of their actions before they take them. Indeed,
the book is never closed on the consequences of our actions, which keep on producing effects
long, long after the actor herself has left the stage. Further, basing legal and moral condem-
nation (or approval) of the use of force on what ultimately occurs carries with it the possi-
bility that less careful, perhaps less scrupulous, powerful states will act first (since they
cannot be criticized at the time of action) and worry about justification later (maybe much
later). Such a situation would only perpetuate and extend the dominance of a few wealthy,
aggressive states.
54. Of course the intervening nation must also consider the effects of the intervention
on its own people. But there is a danger here that can easily interfere with a nation's mo-
tives for intervention. If positive consequences to the intervening nation will flow from the
intervention, it is all too easy to intervene, and then use the proper motives as an after-the-
fact rationalization. In order to avoid this merely rhetorical use of the proper motives, a
nation should look only at the negative consequences of its action on its people. To consider
the positive consequences is to court the danger of being swayed by the wrong considera-
tions. It may well be argued that this is an unrealistic requirement. But that a nation cannot
successfully disengage the consequences to itself from its decision to intervene is merely one
of the many reasons why intervention is unlikely to be justifiable in any actual case. Only if
a nation does make its decisions on the basis of a disinterested desire to resist evil and a
realistic assessment of the consequences to others (and not to itself, except insofar as those
consequences are negative), is humanitarian intervention justified.
55. See Schachter, Legality of Invasion, supra note 1, at 649.
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cally claimed God) as their co-pilot. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Circumstances may be such that the use of force against an oppres-
sive regime may be justified. Still, application of the standards delineated
above would generally lead to a realization that few interventions are
valid legally or morally. It would be the rare case indeed in which human-
itarian intervention is justified. The proposed standards are strict. Like
all standards, however, they are not easy to apply and may not speak
clearly in any given set of facts. Application of these standards requires
extensive, detailed, and objective knowledge of the facts of the case at
hand. Such knowledge may be beyond our abilities, at least in the con-
temporary world,57 but in the absence of sure knowledge about actual
events inside another country, and in the absence of any generally ac-
cepted international fact-finding process, nations must be extremely wary
of using force, regardless of how legitimate that use may seem to be.
It is absolutely essential that nations refer cases of human rights vio-
lations to international bodies, to seek to find as broad-based a consensus
as possible on the facts that allegedly justify the use of force. Most impor-
tantly, leaders and citizens of all nations must always keep in mind the
plain and painful fact that war is obscene, that it means death and great
suffering, and that a new world order must be founded upon a shared
desire to forego the use of that obscene weapon and seek other ways to
ensure that human rights are protected, self-determination is guaranteed,
and international peace and security are created.
56. See Corfu Channel case, supra note 11, at 35.
57. See Ryan & Ferrell, supra note 4.
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